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Since we have heard it said so often and 
know it to be true that wealth will hence-
forth lie in the hands of those who know how 
to control the instruments of knowledge, it 
seems normal and logical to turn to philo-
sophers and, more generally, to those who 
are familiar with the knowledge on which 
our world is built, of whom Heinz Wismann 
is one of the most eminent. M.U.R.S. has 
immediately entrusted him with the task 
of elevating our discussions, whose theme 
moreover is the alleged flatness of our 
world. 
Heinz Wismann represents the two sour-
ces of humanism which have fed our tradi-
tions - the Greco-Latin source on the one 
hand, and that which we associate with the 
European Renaissance on the other hand. I 
do not think that we could have found a bet-
ter thinker to open a conference exploring 
the homogenization of the world which we 
may currently be in the process of creating. 
Some sort of continuity may exist between 
the homogeneity of nature, which Gali-
leo stated was backed by the language of 
maths, and the homogeneity which is pos-
sible thanks to digitalization, symbolized by 
Google. 
Has the world really lost its depth and 
nuances over the centuries? Has it perhaps 
become something that we can fully deci-
pher and manipulate? Is our world disillusio-
ned therefore? Is this what we actually in-
tended when we developed our knowledge? 
I think that Heinz Wismann has always had 
a passion for what makes the world legible 
in depth, for what prevents a review of ex-
planations from being mistaken for super-
ficiality. He has always wanted to explain 
things. His attachment to the languages of 
tradition, and his wariness of what he terms 
“service languages” sums up his passion.
 I am, therefore, delighted that he will be 
opening our discussions on aspects of the 
dialogue which we wish to initiate in the Eu-
ropean knowledge community and I would 
















In 1781, at the end of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant listed the three 
fundamental questions exercising human 
thought: “What can I know?” “What ought 
I do?”, and “What can I hope for?”. He had 
just answered the first question, “What can 
I know?”, by assigning limits to philosophi-
cal ambition. By turning his back completely 
on traditional ontology, by setting aside “the 
thing in itself” (Ding an sich), by drafting the 
formal conditions for all objectifiable experi-
ence, Kant freed science from the straitjacket 
of metaphysics. Exactly 200 years later, in 
1981, another German philosopher, Hans 
Blumenberg, who died in 1996 and who is 
now becoming known in France, revisited in 
some respects the Critique of Pure Reason in 
a book called The Legibility of the World. The 
first sentence of the work picks up on Kant’s 
question, but reframes it. “What did we want 
to know?”, asks Blumenberg, not “What 
can I know?”. “What did we want to know?” 
means that science and the ambitions of 
science can in turn be called into question. 
Has science lived up to its promises? What 
did we in fact want to know? This invites 
us to reflect on the issue of the promises of 
science and also on that of the achievements 
of science which, though spectacular, were 
perhaps disappointing.
This critical inquiry, which exactly mirrors 
Kant’s own, constitutes a new epistemological 
turning point. Philosophical thought will now 
reflect on what Blumenberg locates in the 
past as common interest: what did we want 
to know? The past of the human communi-
ty is thus brought into play. It is no longer 
a question of knowing what we can know in 
absolute terms. The object is to place the 
aims of science in a historical context. The 
model for this new inquiry was developed in 
parallel with the Dictionary of Philosophical 
Concepts, whose project manager, Reinhart 
Koselleck, a historian and philosopher also 
now deceased, diagnosed the expansion of 
the horizon of expectations beyond what he 
termed the area or field of experience as one 
of the fundamental traits of modern Euro-
pean society. Whilst traditional societies are 
characterized by the fact that their expec-
tations are based on the past and do not 
necessarily, or almost never, extend beyond 
what the past offers them in terms of mean-
ing, modern European society as embodied 
by Renaissance utopias, projects itself into 
the future and creates a horizon of expec-
tations which is no longer restricted to the 
legacy of the past. However, this has a par-
ticular logical impact, primarily on historical 
sciences. Every present, including our own, 
can be seen as the future of a past that we 
can now know. Thanks to the relationship 
that our present and all presents have with 
the past as the future, we are in a position 
to evaluate expectations, i.e. the horizons of 
expectation of the past. Blumenberg’s ques-
tion draws its inspiration directly from Kosel-
leck’s epistemological construct.
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Blumenberg wonders what triggered the 
whole scientific venture. What epistemic in-
terest, to use the term introduced by Max 
Weber, lies at the origin of this mental ad-
venture? From what interest originated by 
us, which can be located historically and 
is shared throughout society, does scien-
tific endeavour stem? This interest must 
be identified so that we can know whether 
the promises related to it have been kept. 
Therefore, in order to identify this common 
interest, Blumenberg takes as his starting 
point a radical theory. He asserts that the in-
terest guiding scientific endeavour cannot be 
expressed directly in the scientific idiom. The 
interest which underlies the spread of scien-
tific research is initially expressed in a lan-
guage which does not belong to the science 
which is developing. The power of scientific 
discourse resides specifically in the fact that 
it eliminates everything which does not en-
able it formally to target its aims, in order to 
ensure the relevance of its approach.
For Blumenberg, the interest which pre-
sides over all scientific endeavours belongs 
in its initial form to the common language. 
It is a compelling argument to maintain 
that when science is used rigorously it is 
based initially on a rhetorical achievement, 
an agreement sealed by a metaphor. In The 
Legibility of the World, Blumenberg attempts 
to trace one of these seminal metaphors, 
the metaphor of the book. Actually, the idea 
that a single book replacing all other books 
could contain all that there is to know and 
understand, only emerged at a certain point 
in history. It is not an idea which has always 
existed, like an anthropological constant. Al-
phabets, writing, an abundance of texts and 
all sorts of means of circulation of texts were 
required before idea of a single book, the 
Book of books suddenly appeared in the his-
tory of humankind. From that moment on-
wards, the meaning of all things was sought 
through deciphering this Book, rather than 
observing the world of phenomena. During 
the Renaissance, in a strategic reversal, scien- 
tists, in the modern sense of the term, then 
declared that they would now decipher “the 
Book of nature”. The metaphor remains the 
same. This is an intentional shift because 
the aim at the time was to lend legitimacy to 
science by comparing it with what the Book 
of books had hitherto promised to deliver in 
the way of revelation of knowledge. 
There is a confrontation scene in Brecht’s 
Galileo Galilei which sums up this reversal 
perfectly. On one side of the prince are the 
doctors of the church, the guardians of tra-
ditional knowledge. They are holding the 
works of Aristotle which are used to sup-
port their reading of the Bible. On the other 
side, slightly lower down, is Galileo with his 
telescope, which offers the promise of new 
facts based on direct observation. While 
the teachers keep repeating, “Aristotle said 
that...”, Galileo simply requests: “Come and 
see. Come down from your scholastic ped-
estal and see”. This scene is the prototype 
for the issue in which we are interested, 
because tension was to increase over the 














is written using a normal alphabet and the 
Book of nature which people decipher using 
new alphabets, for which mathematics are 
the main vector. It is amusing to note that 
in Galileo’s day, a Jesuit named Emmanuele 
Tesauro wrote a rhetorical treatise entitled The 
Aristotelian Telescope to challenge Galileo’s 
initiative, as if there needed to be the equiva- 
lent of this telescope in the field of books, 
which would help people observe nature it-
self. Therefore, Blumenberg goes so far as 
to claim that the key concept of natural his-
tory, evolution, is based on the metaphor of 
the Book of nature, since the scroll was a 
roll, whose unrolling could also be applied to 
natural phenomena. Pursuing this metaphor 
throughout his demonstration, he points out, 
citing Schrödinger, that hopes of deciphering 
human genetic codes still draw inspiration 
from the idea that reality should be able to 
be read. 
In relation to this initial metaphor, which 
has nothing to do with science as such, we 
can ask ourselves if the promise which it 
re-presents has been kept. Has the world, 
the whole world, been made legible by deci- 
phering the Book of nature? This is where 
doubt can creep in, where unprecedented 
tension can occur. In fact, this tension, this 
opposition exists between reading which en-
compasses all the possible meanings of hu-
man and divine endeavour, and deciphering 
the Book of nature, whose method restricts 
this ambition to establishing certainties which 
can be verified by every person subjecting 
themselves to the same methodological re-
quirements, has never ceased to exercise 
the most informed minds. 
There might be an inevitable discrepancy 
between these two sides of our universe of 
knowledge, requiring an in-depth analysis of 
how much of what we had initially hoped for 
or even announced has been lost or dimi-
nished during the process.
This discrepancy emerges already in the 
Bible, between the stories of Babel and Pen-
tecost. In the story of Babel, the multiplici-
ty of languages is depicted as a punishment 
inflicted on human pride and the dream of 
rediscovering the original language with 
which everybody could communicate with 
everybody else is depicted as reparation or 
even redemption. However, this universal 
language would be a language which de- 
signates the realities to which it refers using 
a one-to-one mapping. It is a denotative lan-
guage which assumes that reality is identi-
cal for everybody. When the apostles started 
speaking “in tongues” during the miracle of 
Pentecost, the notion prevailed that each 
individual had some form of experience of 
the world to be communicated, which led 
to an explosion of idioms. Here, the miracle 
or dream of redemption lies in the fact that 
all those who speak in tongues, who diver-
sify the way in which they express their ex- 
perience, understand each other. 
Science is caught between precisely the 
same two extremes. Science cannot be com-
pared to the miracle of Pentecost. Science 
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tends more towards Babel. This is signifi-
cant. But because science is on the side of 
this denotative one-to-one, clear and univer-
sal language, it may lose access to the initial 
sources of its own anxiety. Maybe what scien- 
ce wanted could only be expressed in another 
language which involves considerable diver-
sity, an essentially connotative rather than 
denotative language, namely metaphorical 
language. 
What I wanted to suggest by using Blu-
menberg’s hypothesis as a starting point is 
that the influence of science in our modern 
society is dependent on an aspiration which 
scientific language cannot reproduce in its en-
tirety. Therefore, there is probably little point 
in trying to boast of the successes of science 
using scientific language. However, it is very 
difficult to talk about science in anything 
other than scientific language, because this 
contradicts its legitimate methodological re-
quirements. Hence the point of Blumenberg’s 
question: “What did we want to know?”. How 
can we express our shared interest at the 
outset and which language should we use, 
since it must by definition be a non-scientific 
language? I think that only an educational 
programme which places connotative lan-
guage - i.e. the historic richness of natural 
languages which have become national lan-
guages in our world - at the centre of a re-
vamped curriculum for learning can provide 
us with the basis for profound thought on the 
interests which have been lending legitimacy 
to scientific endeavour since the outset. 
We should not dream of a purely scientific 
transformation in our education system, as if 
it were possible to motivate people by sim-
ply bringing them face to face with science 
as it is developing and being practised. This 
is an idea that has been widely supported 
and I think that this is a serious mistake. 
The interest which underscores scientific en-
deavour can only be expressed in non-scien-
tific language. This presupposes that we im-
merse ourselves in the historic authenticity 
of our linguistic and cultural heritage so that 
schools become places where we can man-
age to speak in tongues. This is undoubtedly 
where the future of science will be decided. 
Jean-Michel Besnier
 
I would like to thank Heinz Wismann on 
your behalf for setting these two days in the 
context of the story of Babel and the single 
language which would unite us and the Pen-
tecost miracle of the redeeming spirit. Thank 
you for putting the very science which we 
want to draw into dialogue into perspective. 
As has already been mentioned, all types of 
present were futures in the past which we 
were able to know. I would now like to invite 
you to suspend time for a coffee break just 
outside. 
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